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INTRODUCTION
Rights, Mark Tushnet once opined, are positively harmful to the
party of humanity.1 Conceding some exceptions—most notably the
civil rights victories of the 1950s through 1970s—Morton Horwitz
observed around the same time that U.S. constitutional rights have
historically overwhelmingly served to further entrench the holdings
of the propertied class against attempts at democratic redistribu-
tion, thereby discrediting both the idea of equality and the processes
of democracy.2 Rights, and particularly rights to privacy, Catharine
MacKinnon argued in a series of searing articles in the 1980s, do
little but legitimize and protect oppression within intimate spheres
of social, sexual, and economic intercourse, thus injuring women’s
interests in security and equality far more than could any unwanted
pregnancy.3 Antidiscrimination rights, Alan Freeman urged, do
almost nothing to address, and indeed do quite a bit to further insu-
late, the subordination of racial minorities that is the product of
private and institutional forces, which purportedly neutral govern-
ment decisions then validate and further entrench.4 Rights against
government intervention into private agreements or contracts might
guard the rights holder against an over-reaching or moralistic
government, Bob Gordon and others argued, but by doing so they
strengthen the hand of the rights holder against weaker parties
within the sphere of contractual insularity constructed by the right.5 
These claims, and others like them, constituted what came to be
called in the 1980s the “rights critique.”6 It was authored by a group
of scholars, sometimes referred to as the “rights critics.”7 The rights
critique, in turn, was the moral heart of the Critical Legal Studies
1. Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1384 (1984).
2. See Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 396-98 (1988).
3. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93, 93 (1987).
4. See Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049,
1053-54 (1978).
5. See Robert W. Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 195, 198-99 (1987).
6. See infra notes 8, 13
7. See infra notes 8, 13.
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(CLS) movement.8 It was also, for a brief moment in time, ubiqui-
tous. It may have set your teeth on edge, but you could not get away
from it even if you tried.9 But you should not have wanted to escape
exposure to these critical challenges to the moral righteousness of
rights, which were then and are still the moral coin of the realm of
law, as Patricia Williams poignantly argued in her influential—and
unwittingly fatal response.10 The rights critique challenged rights’
moral stature. As such, it was one of the most vibrant, important,
counterintuitive, challenging set of ideas that emerged from the
legal academy over the course of the last quarter of the twentieth
century.11 It deserves recognition as a signature accomplishment.
The rights critique has also virtually disappeared from contem-
porary legal scholarship and pedagogy. We do not hear much, if
anything, of rights’ wrongs anymore—of their subordinating, legit-
imating, and alienating effects. The beginning of this silence can be
traced to approximately 1990, when both founders and their critics
started widely proclaiming the death of the CLS movement.12 The
8. For other historical accounts of the origins and content of the rights critique, see
generally Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). Kennedy tends to
center the indeterminacy critique over the political arguments I have summarized above and
identifies as the essence of the critique the claim that rights simply reflect the political
interests of their holders and nothing more transcendent. Id. at 184-85. There was
unquestionably a strand of this “realist” critique of rights in the writings from the 1980s, but
in my view this approach badly shortchanges the moral and political content of the critique,
as expressed  by most participants. I have criticized Kennedy’s “interest-based” account of
the rights critique in ROBIN WEST, Introduction to NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION 1, 1-11 (2011). For other more contemporaneous accounts of the role of the
rights critique in CLS writing, see Horwitz, supra note 2, at 393; Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies]; Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1363.
9. See generally Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984);
David Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656 (1986). Between these two very
different accounts of CLS, the latter is considerably more sympathetic than the former.
10. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404-05 (1987) (arguing that CLS ignored the value of
rights to minorities and the poor and the differences in which whites and blacks experience
rights).
11. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Through a Glass, Darkly, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 167, 168 (1989)
(book review) (“In its original incarnation at the Harvard Law School in the mid-1970s, the
Critical Legal Studies movement represented the most significant intellectual challenge to
conventional legal thought since 1930s Realism.”).
12. See E. Dean Neacsu, CLS Stands for Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8
J.L. & POL’Y 415, 416 (2000) (“CLS no longer seems to possess a voice comprehensible to
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rights critics have been particularly mute, however, during the age
of Obama, from 2008 to the present.13 
This muteness, I believe, is strange. The three-pronged rights
critique articulated by the rights critics—that U.S. constitutional
rights politically insulate and valorize subordination, legitimate and
thus perpetuate greater injustices than they address, and socially
alienate us from community—is, if anything, much easier to defend
and explain today than it was then, in liberal rights’ heyday. Then,
to so many people, constitutional rights, welfare rights, civil rights,
positive rights, human rights, the very idea of rights—rights per
se14—were seemingly a vehicle for liberation from both oppression
anyone outside its own small circle.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism
Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 583 (2006) (stating that “critical constitutionalism” is less
influential today than ever before); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 8, at 1539-41
(noting that the academy’s acceptance of CLS gave CLS legitimacy but also led to its
weakening and a defusing of its “political explosiveness”).
13. The exception, if we look at the entire decade of the aughts, is Janet Halley and
Wendy Brown’s attempt in 2002 to reignite Critical Legal Theory. See supra note 8. Other
than Kennedy’s reprinted critique of rights in that volume, however, there is little in it that
continues the moral and political themes of the rights critic. The book is far more absorbed
with criticism of feminism on the familiar liberal grounds that it demonizes sex; diversity
arguments for affirmative action, on the grounds that they essentialize racial difference; and
campaigns for gay marriage, on the grounds that they normalize a healthy and vital political
deviance. See Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity
Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 41-43; Janet Halley, Sexuality
Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 80-82; Michael Warner,
Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 262-63. The only
piece in the book that argues forcefully that a left-liberal right legitimizes larger injustice in
a way that tracks rights critiques from the 1980s, is Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester’s
chapter on the construction of learning disabilities as a “civil right.” See Mark Kelman &
Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at
137-39. For critical commentary on Left Legalism’s narrow focus, see Martha T. McCluskey,
Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s Rise, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1193-97
(2007) and ROBIN WEST, Critical Legal Studies—The Missing Years, in NORMATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 8, at 107, 170-76. See also Peter Gabel, Critical Legal Studies as
a Spiritual Practice, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 515, 515-16 (2009) (attempting to explain the
disappearance of CLS by reference to the prominence of the indeterminacy critique and the
decline of its spiritual argument). 
14. “We want our rights and we don’t care how / We want our revolution NOW.” PETER
WEISS, MARAT/SADE, act 1, sc. 5 in PETER WEISS, MARAT/SADE, THE INVESTIGATION, AND THE
SHADOW OF THE BODY OF THE COACHMAN 49 (Geoffrey Skelton & Robert Cohen trans.,
Continuum Publishing Co. 1998). Kennedy captures this mood in The Critique of Rights in
Critical Legal Studies in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8. Barbara Jordan more
famously captured it in one line in her statement in the House Judiciary Committee during
the debate on the articles of impeachment against Richard Nixon: “My faith in the
Constitution is whole, it is complete, it is total.” Debate on Articles of Impeachment Pursuant
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and imperialism. Then, the gains to be had from counter-major-
itarian institutions, such as individual rights, constitutionalism,
judicial review, and an independent judiciary friendly to the party
of humanity and ready to enforce rights, were still so palpable, so
fresh, so present. Then, demanding rights still tasted so right in the
mouths of the oppressed.15 Thirty years later, in the age of Obama,
it is much easier to see the harms all those cherished and lauded
rights have done, as I will briefly argue below.16
How to explain the disappearance of the rights critique? One
possibility, much endorsed by the critics themselves, is that the
rights critique collapsed under the weight of responses from femi-
nists and minority scholars, who pushed back against the critics’
characterization of rights as regressive and alienating. The re-
sponders found in the liberal rights traditions a path to greater
racial and sexual justice—even assuming the legitimating, subordi-
nating, and alienating features the rights critics noted.17
to H. Res. 803 Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 111 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Jordan). 
15. Williams, supra note 10, at 414 (“[For blacks,] the experience of rights-assertion has
been one of both solidarity and freedom, of empowerment of an internal and very personal
sort; it has been a process of finding the self.”).
16. See infra Part I.
17. See Gary Minda, Neil Gotanda and the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 4 ASIAN L.J.
7, 13-14 (1997) (stating that CLS weakened as a political movement following the arrival of
“outsiders (women, gays, lesbians, Marxists, Postmodernists, Rock n’Rollers, etc.)” whose
identification as groups led to internal tension within the CLS movement); John Henry
Schlegel, For Peter, with Love, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 537-38 (2009) (stating that Schlegel
turned from CLS when the movement abandoned its theoretical enterprise in order to
accommodate the political positions of women and people of color); see also Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 1-37. There is
an undeniable grain of truth here, although it is easy enough to overstate it. What is clear is
that the most important response to the rights critique came from critical race scholars,
including Kimberlé Crenshaw and Patricia Williams. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334-35 (1988); Williams, supra note 10, at 404-05; see also Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1988); Robin West, Commentary,
Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split, 2 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 86-87 (1986); Robin West,
Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
145, 146-47 (1985) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence as Narrative]. Horwitz’s piece on rights
was itself a response to the “minority scholars” response to the rights critics, as they were
then called. See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 393; see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda,
Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii-xxxii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). On the
other hand, it is also clear that the rights critique was largely built around contributions from
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Others have urged a different explanation: that the rise of a
conservative understanding of state power has forced an alliance
between critical scholars and liberal rights aficionados, in effect a
temporary truce in the face of a larger menace.18 On this account,
the rights critique was a friendly or internal criticism of liberalism,
and in the face of a common enemy, the differences were muted.
Elsewhere I have suggested a different explanation: that the pre-
mature demise of the rights critique is best explained by reference
to shortcomings internal to the critique itself.19 My suggestion in
other work, in summary, has been that there was an internal
tension, and perhaps a fatal contradiction, in the original presenta-
tion of the rights critique, which it simply did not survive over
time.20 The “rights critique” was almost always paired with, and
sometimes viewed as a part of, the “indeterminacy critique”—that
all of law, including law that is captured in rights, is indeterminate
both in meaning and application.21 But if the indeterminacy critique
is correct, then not only rights worship, so to speak, but also the
rights critique, is in trouble: rights cannot harm any more than they
can liberate, if they are inconsequential or meaningless. As between
the critique of rights put forward on moral and political grounds—
that rights alienate, subordinate, and legitimate—and the critique
of rights as indeterminate, the latter simply won out. It has been
feminists and race scholars. MacKinnon’s work on both the legitimating effects of the privacy
doctrine and the First Amendment fueled the rights critique in its original formulation, as did
that of race scholars on the legitimating effects of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine on
structural racism. See MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 206-13; Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-23
(1980); Freeman, supra note 4; Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318-23 (1987). Critical
legal scholars quite routinely cited and discussed the work of these critical race theorists,
feminists, and others as exemplary of the major themes in critical scholarship, notably the
legitimating and subordinating effects of liberal legalism. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 127-28, 285 (1987) (discussing the arguments of Catharine
MacKinnon and myself); Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 26-27
(1993) (discussing the arguments of Catharine MacKinnon). 
18. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 12, at 581-82, 588 (stating that liberals and conserv-
atives have formed coalitions to attack terrorism-related policies on the basis of “rule-of-law”
values). 
19. WEST, supra note 13. Peter Gabel suggests a similar explanation for the demise of
critical legal studies. Gabel, supra note 13, at 517-20.
20. See generally WEST, supra note 13.
21. Gabel, supra note 13, at 516.
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completely absorbed into utterly mainstream legal thought. The
moral and political critique of rights, though, has virtually disap-
peared.
For my purposes here, the cause of the rights critique’s disappear-
ance is not particularly important. What I argue in this Article is
that whatever the reason, the disappearance of the rights critique
is unfortunate. We need the rights critique, or some modernized,
revitalized version of it, in the Obama era and in whatever era
might follow, perhaps even more than when it was first conceived.
More to the point, we need a critical way of thinking about rights
that not only survives across generations but also adapts to the
changing contours of rights. We need a body of scholarship critical
of rights that is sufficiently robust to withstand internal disagree-
ment, the winds of political correctness, the anger of compatriots
who may feel abandoned or worse, and the rise or fall of various
political alliances. The rights critique we have inherited from the
1980s, however, is virtually none of these; it did not prove robust,
longstanding, or regenerative. Putting the points together yields
this moral: we need to resuscitate and revise this line of thought,
not bury it. In order to do so, we will have to first uproot it, shear its
fading or dead branches, and then replant it in more generative soil.
This task should not be so hard.
In Part I below, I first attempt a summary of the rights critique
and then explain its continuing relevance to Obama-era rights.
Parts II and III suggest how we might refashion the rights critique
in a way that better reflects the sometimes tragic dimension of
contemporary Obama-era rights. In the Conclusion I draw some
general conclusions for the state of our politics. 
I. THE RIGHTS CRITIQUE IN THE AGE OF OBAMA
Rights harm us, according to the Bill of Particulars put forward
by the rights critics of the 1980s, in three distinct ways. First, even
apparently liberating rights that seemingly expand the sphere of
individual liberty also subordinate, at least according to the first
and perhaps the most important of the rights critics’ charges. Rights
to privacy protect not only private decision making against the
prying and moralistic eye of the state but also, even if inadvertently
720 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:713
or indirectly, private subordination of vulnerable family members.22
Rights to liberty of contract protect private choices of individuals
but also the economic subordination of laborers by employers,23 and
rights to speech protect ideas but also, arguably, pornography and
private verbal, racial, or sexual harassment.24 Whatever else rights
do, Horwitz, Tushnet, MacKinnon, and other critics argued, rights
that protect spheres of privacy, liberty, or autonomy against state
intervention also, and by virtue of that protection, facilitate the
subordination of the weak by the strong, within whatever spheres
of insularity, entitlement, and nonintervention from the government
the particular right in question creates. Thus, the first charge:
rights subordinate. 
Second, by protecting against particularized but well-defined
sorts of unfair relations in the private realm, even those rights that
do operate to specify limits on a generalized liberty in the interest
of equality—such as limits on our liberty to intentionally discrimi-
nate—also run the risk of legitimizing the larger unjust social world
within which those particularized moments of injustice are framed.
The censure of the intentional discriminator, and our right to be free
of him, for example, legitimates not only structural or unintentional
racism but also an unjust classism. Our condemnation of the errors
in an error-ridden meritocracy legitimates the unjust stinginess of
the ways we construct merit and blame, and even a purified and
idealized meritocracy legitimates our nonresponsiveness to human
need.25 Miranda rights, critics argued, and more largely procedural
protections in the criminal justice system, legitimate not only on-
going interrogation abuses that they only partially address but an
overly punitive and blatantly racist system of excessive incarcera-
tion as well.26 The targeting of gender-based “stereotypes” so as to
free the nonconforming woman legitimate the belittling and
cramped opportunities that attach to voluntarily assumed tradi-
tional gender roles.27 Attempts to secure rights to a “minimum
22. MACKINNON, supra note 3. 
23. Gordon, supra note 5; Horwitz, supra note 2. 
24. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 163-197.
25. See Robin West, Constitutional Fictions and Meritocratic Success Stories, 53 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 995, 1010-19 (1996). 
26. See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 673 (1992).
27. See Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 60 (2002) (finding
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wage” render all the more difficult attempts to ensure a livable
family wage—and so on.28 Rights harm, then, not only because of
the subordination they protect and valorize but also because they
distract our critical gaze, thereby legitimating larger injustices. In
brief, rights legitimate.29
Lastly, critics argued, rights alienate, even those rights that
seemingly empower the weakest of us in a hostile world. They alien-
ate us from the dreaded other from whom they claim to protect us,30
from our communities,31 and from a recognition of even the possibil-
ity of unmediated human connection.32 Rights do have a function:
they facilitate essential trade between withdrawn selves, as elu-
cidated by Peter Gabel’s artful description of us as deeply and
paranoically fearful of others, the state, and human community.33
But by so doing, rights intensify the very withdrawal from human
life to which they then offer their poison pill as a necessary reme-
diation. In short: rights alienate.
Now, whither the rights critique today? If anything, U.S. consti-
tutional rights in the age of Obama are more overtly Lochnerian,34
that greater value must be placed on community, care-taking, relationships, and
fulfillment—values that are traditionally under-appreciated “feminine qualities”); Mary
Becker, Caring for Children and Caretakers, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001)
(observing that an increasing number of feminists argue that women will be unequal unless
greater value is placed on supporting caretakers of dependents); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and
Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 32-35 (noting that
liberal feminism accommodates women but only on patriarchal terms without challenging the
patriarch itself).
28. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1344-45; Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the
Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295, 362-
91 (1988).
29. Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769, 797 (“[Neo-classicism] is a
method that could only be invented and adhered to by apologists, those whose interest was
in reassuring us all of the beneficence of whatever order happens to emerge from the interplay
of market forces, regardless of the nature of the society in which that market functions.”).
30. Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (1984). 
31. Id. at 1569-71.
32. Id. at 1572-81. 
33. Id. at 1567,1576-78. 
34. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochnerism, of course, generally refers
to a particular view of the liberty “prong” of the substantive Due Process Clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which valorized contract and property at the expense of
congressional and state legislative power to engage in paternalist or redistributive legislation
initiatives. See David A. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism Revised: Lochner and the
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more economically regressive,35 more aggressively colorblind,36 more
insulating of the private sphere and of intimate violence,37 and,
particularly when coupled with new technologies, more alienating
than they were when Gabel first leveled that sad charge against
them.38 Obama-era rights, viewed from the perspective of the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-10 (2003). What I call the
new Lochnerism relies not as much on the Fourteenth Amendment per se as on limits on the
commerce power, and an emasculation of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to achieve
largely the same end. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that
a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence is outside Commerce Clause
authority); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down a prohibition on
the knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone as outside Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that
government may not restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that prohibitions on handgun possession in the
home and on use of a handgun for self-defense in the home violate the Second Amendment);
Bernstein, supra, at 5-9 (stating that a growing tide of libertarian scholarship has come to
challenge traditional views of Lochner as the Supreme Court’s imposition of its laissez-faire
views).
35. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
36. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733-
35, 748 (2007) (striking down student assignment plans that employed race as a factor in the
assignment of students to oversubscribed schools and stating that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”).
37. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766-68 (2005) (finding no due process interest
in the enforcement by police of a restraining order against an estranged husband); Morrison,
529 U.S. at 601-02. For a critique of gay marriage cases and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), for insulating intimate violence from public scrutiny and political redress, see Marc
Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1387-89 (2005) [hereinafter
Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon]; Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1631-57 (2004) [hereinafter Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence].
38. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text; cf. Soledad Liliana Escobar-Chaves &
Craig A. Anderson, The Future of Children, 18 CHILD. & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 147, 147-48
(2008) (evaluating research on connections between a minor’s use of electronic media and
unhealthy behaviors); Claus J. Tully, Growing Up in Technological Worlds: How Modern
Technologies Shape the Everyday Lives of Young People, 23 BULL. OF SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 444,
444 (2003) (describing the harmful impact of new technology on the social relationships of
young people). The Supreme Court recently considered the possible impact of violent video
games on children and concluded that restrictions on their sale to minors violates the First
Amendment. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n., 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). Lower courts had been
in agreement, as well. See, e.g., Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d
950, 962-64 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448); Entm’t
Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519 F.3d 768, 769-772 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming permanent
injunction against enforcement of Minnesota law prohibiting the sale of “Mature” and “Adult
Only” video games to minors); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 650 (7th
Cir. 2006) (holding that criminalization of sale of sexually explicit video games to minors
violated the First Amendment). 
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1980s rights critique, seem at first to be simply a story of plus ça
change. Thus, our contemporary rights subordinate, just as the
critics charged, and as Heller39 and Citizens United illustrate.40 It is
hard to doubt that gun rights subordinate the interests of the weak
to those empowered with lethal weaponry, particularly in the
domestic setting of the home, and that extending speech rights to
corporations to influence political elections subordinates individual
to corporate interests. 
Second, Obama-era rights rhetorically legitimate, again in much 
the way critics thought they might. Perhaps most notable, the new,
improved, and expanded “right to marry” now extends to same-sex
couples in much of the country41 and enjoys the support of both the
progressive left and social conservatives alike.42 The right will also
likely soon be given the Supreme Court’s seal of constitutional
approval.43 Nevertheless, it carries at least two quite serious and
largely unnoticed legitimation costs. First, and as a number of
commentators have noted, the “right to marry” is at heart an eco-
nomic entitlement that extends a fairly long list of not very
39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. Heller creates a private world in which guns are permitted,
thus subordinating the interests of the relatively weak to the interests of the strong,
particularly in domestic households. Thus, on the day of the decision in McDonald v. Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies against the states),
Mayor Daley complained that the case would exacerbate the problems faced by domestic
violence victims and first responders, and would also affect armed abusers. Richard M. Daley,
Mayor, City of Chicago, Press Conference (June 28, 2010). 
40. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916-17. Citizens United clearly strengthens the hand of
corporations by broadening their access to elected officials. Id.
41. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the designation of
marriage must be available to both same-sex and opposite-sex couples), superseded by
constitutional amendment CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207
P.3d 48, 93 (Cal. 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008)
(holding that state failed to sufficiently justify same-sex marriage ban in state equal
protection challenge); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009) (holding that a
statutory limitation of civil marriage to unions between a man and woman denied equal
protection of the law to gay and lesbian people); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d
941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (holding that ban on same-sex marriage violated state constitution).
42. Sandhya Somashekhar, Same-Sex Marriage Gains GOP Support, WASH. POST, Aug.
27, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR201008270
5614.html.
43. See Josh Gerstein, Ted Olson: Supreme Court Could Give ‘Incremental’ Win to Same-
Sex Marriage, UNDER THE RADAR (May 18, 2011 12:52 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
joshgerstein/0511/Ted_Olson_Supreme_Court_could_give_incremental_win_to_samesex_
marriage.html. 
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generous financial benefits to some members of the polity lucky
enough to find a marriage partner.44 The right grants entitlements
to a spouse’s employer-granted health insurance, his or her re-
tirement benefits, military benefits, and workers’ compensation
payments, thereby allowing those with spouses to marginally hedge
their bets against life’s risks. Not coincidentally, whatever good
this does the marital partners, it also further legitimates the lack
of a more robust safety net for all. What poor people should do,
simply, is marry, if they wish to improve their economic prospects.
Trumpeting the economic value of marriage—its utility as a pri-
vatized safety net for the partners and hence a lifting of the burden
of social responsibility on the rest of us—was a shared project of
both the Bush and Clinton administrations, both of whom viewed
marriage as a privatized safety net and therefore urged it on poor
citizens.45 The Bush- and Clinton-era marriage-promotion project for
poor citizens and the equal rights advocates’ case for same-sex
marriage pushed by devotees of same-sex marriage rest on precisely
the same premise: marriage is a privatized safety net given by the
state to marital partners. The latter advocacy effort simply adds
that it should be made available to gay as well as straight citizens. 
The “right to marry” that has come to fruition during the Obama
years is simply the logical outcome of both movements—the
marriage promotion movement of the Clinton-Bush years and the
equal rights campaign of more recent vintage. Once it comes to full
realization, it will no doubt bring tremendous psychic benefits to
44. See generally ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 71-86, 141-45 (2007)
(discussing the legitimating effects of marriage and the advantages under the law that
married couples receive compared to unmarried couples). 
45. For any overview of the empirical claims about the benefits of marriage, which were
politically powerful during the 1990s and early 2000s, see LINDA WAITE & MAGGIE
GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND
BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). The economic value of marriage has since emerged as a
central argument of advocates for marriage rights for gay and lesbian citizens as well. See,
e.g., Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/08/the-conservative-case-for-gay-marriage.html
(discussing access to economic benefits and security as a crucial aspect of the equal protection
of legal marriage); Why Marriage?, http://www.whymarriagematters.org/pages/why-marriage
(last visited Oct. 11, 2011). For emerging mainstream criticism of the economics benefits angle
to gay rights activism, made by people who support gay marriage for other rights-based
reasons, see, for example, Jaye Cee Whitehead, Editorial, The Wrong Reasons for Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at A21.
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those who have had their sexual and personal identities shattered
or torn by societal nonrecognition. It will also, however, further
cement, through the relentlessness of legitimating levers, the felt
justice of an inadequate safety net for all others, who for whatever
reason are not within the benighted circle of marital choice. That is
the first legitimation cost. 
But there is a second legitimation cost, less noticed in the eu-
phoria and struggle to win the right to marry for same-sex couples,
particularly when that right is read, as it should be, in conjunction
with the recently expanded right to sexual privacy for gay as well as
straight sex.46 The right to marry, and the right to gay sex, at least
rhetorically, further cements the legitimacy of the subordination
that occurs within the bounds of intimacy and marital privacy.
Crimes that occur within intimate relationships such as marriage
are indeed still crimes and have been recognized as such since the
advent of domestic violence movements. But the valorization and
now constitutionalization of marriage at the heart of a right to
privacy risks further insulating that violence within walls of con-
stitutional privacy.47 The broad coalition of groups, individuals, and
courts increasingly inclined to recognize and expand marital rights
further protects intimate and marital privacy but arguably does so
at the cost of rhetorically insulating the sexual violence and coercion
that sometimes occurs within the bedroom walls. Now, it does so for
the benefit of same-sex as well as opposite-sex partners.
The legitimation of institutional, unconscious, private, or simply
unintentional forms of racial subordination has also arguably
accelerated during this time of governance by an African American
President, aided by a Court intent on restraining affirmative action
or race conscious remedies of other sorts. Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 148 cleanly legiti-
mates the inadequacy of unequal schooling and housing by granting
a formal right against state-sponsored segregation in precisely the
46. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
47. See Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, supra note 37, at 1405 (arguing that gay
marriage legitimates wrongs of marriage, including its insulation of violence); Spindelman,
Surviving Lawrence, supra note 37, at 1633-35 (arguing that the right to consensual sex
created by Lawrence legitimates intimate violent sexual coercion).
48. 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
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way that Alan Freeman first predicted.49 There could not be a
clearer demonstration of the critical claim—put forward by Alan
Freeman, Derrick Bell, Charles Lawrence, and a host of other early
critical scholars—that achievement of limited formal racial equality
in some spheres of employment and schooling, through a legal
approach focusing on the perpetrator’s state of mind, legitimates the
unfairness and lack of generosity of winner-take-all approaches to
education and employment in which the losers, whether or not
intentionally targeted by race, are both disproportionately black and
nearly universally poor.50 
And finally, rights in the age of Obama alienate in both new and
old ways. In its original formulation, Peter Gabel’s “pact of the
withdrawn selves” was captured by a metaphoric transaction he
used repeatedly to communicate the essence of his critique: the
placid noncommunication between a customer in a bank and a
teller, when the customer goes in to the bank to exercise his right to
deposit or withdraw cash from his account.51 That entire transac-
tion, Gabel observed, is heavily structured by layer upon layer of
rights: rights protecting the bank owners from trespass, rights
entitling the teller to a paycheck, rights protecting the employer’s
power to fire her at will, rights entitling the customer to money
charged to his account, rights that structure the relations of payor
and payee, drawer and drawee, and so on, rights protecting both the
bank and the customer against theft and fraud, and rights protect-
ing the security of the customer’s account from calamitous bank
failure.52 The human relation between the teller and customer is so
49. Freeman, supra note 4, at 1053-55.
50. See Derrick A. Bell, Diversity and Academic Freedom, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 371, 372
(1993) (“[Antidiscrimination policies] are [the] outward manifestations of unspoken and
perhaps unconscious policy conclusions that racial remedies—when they occur—are promoted
to secure or advance societal interests deemed important by the upper classes.”); Derrick Bell,
Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 369-70 (1992) (critiquing use of formalistic equality
language in order to mask policy preferences that privilege whites); Freeman, supra note 4,
at 1053-55 (arguing that people generally view antidiscrimination law from a “perpetrator
perspective” in which responsibility for discrimination belongs solely to specific actors—not
as a result of a wider social phenomenon); Lawrence, supra note 17, at 324 (“[T]he existing
intent requirement’s assignment of individualized fault or responsibility for the existence of
racial discrimination distorts our perceptions about the causes of discrimination and leads us
to think about racism in a way that advances the disease rather than combating it.”).
51. Gabel, supra note 30, at 1568.
52. Id. at 1571.
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encrusted with rights that its humanity virtually disappears. Might
some of that layering of rights, he wondered, be implicated in the
utter inability of the customer and the teller to even acknowledge,
much less celebrate, their mutual humanity? Gabel thought so.53
Today, thirty years later, hardly anyone encounters a teller for that
transaction. We go outside to stand in line to effectuate the
transaction with a machine, and we do that only on the rare
occasions when our home banking system cannot accomplish the
same end. Gabel might observe that rights now form the lingua
franca of a pact not between withdrawn selves but between
withdrawn selves and the machines that facilitate as well as police
the withdrawal. 
Indeed, rights that facilitate the mechanization of our interactive
lives alienate our withdrawn selves from community, if anything,
more aggressively and more blatantly than did the nondiscrimina-
tion rights and the identity rights to reproductive freedom that
formed the target of the various rights critiques in the 1980s.54
Again, one might think that rights critics would at least be claiming
vindication. Maybe they are embarrassed by just how transparent
it has all become; maybe it has all become too obvious for words. But
for whatever reason, no one in the legal academy is examining
whether the alienation cyberspace effectuates might be impacting
communitarian values, and whether that trade-off is affecting legal
regimes.
II. TRAGIC RIGHTS
The story of Obama-era rights, however, is not entirely plus ça
change. Obama-era rights do not simply repeat, or exaggerate, the
pathologies of rights about which the rights critics complained.
There is something new afoot. Obama-era rights have two quite
tragic characteristics that were not shared by the rights of the
1980s. As a result, Obama-era rights harm in ways not adequately
captured by the three-pronged rights critique. Both features, I will
argue, suggest that the rights critique of the 1980s should not
53. Id. at 1568-69.
54. Id. at 1587-88.
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simply be revisited or expanded, but rather rethought in light of
those differences. 
First, Obama-era rights are simply more lethal than were those
antidiscrimination and privacy rights targeted by the original
rights critiques.55 By far the most jurisprudentially far-reaching
and singularly innovative Obama-Bush-era right—the Second
Amendment right to bear arms, first articulated during the end of
the Bush era in District of Columbia v. Heller and then underscored
at the beginning of Obama’s presidency in McDonald v. Chicago—
quite directly empowers individuals to kill.56 The newly minted right
created by the Supreme Court in those two cases grants a citizen the
right to not only purchase and own a handgun but also the funda-
mental or “inherent” right to use it, rather than retreat, in self-
defense or in defense of his family members, at least in his home,
and perhaps outside his home as well.57 Both the right to arm
oneself and the newly recognized right to kill rather than retreat
constitute a dramatic reinterpretation of the conventional and
liberal Lockean and Hobbesian understanding of the social compact,
the state, and its purpose.58 The individual, it is worth recalling,
under the traditional liberal account of the social compact, gives up
his right to use violence in defense of his property and self in
exchange for the state’s promise to provide equal protection of the
state’s powers of enforcement against the threats posed by others
inclined to invade one’s legal rights.59 
Under conventional criminal law principles governing self-defense
rules of several centuries’ vintage, this compact is duly recorded: the
threatened individual has a duty to “retreat” and abstain from force,
in implicit reliance on the power of the state—rather than his own
arsenal—to protect him. The duty to retreat was then qualified by
the “castle doctrine,” which, under pre-Heller criminal law doctrine,
55. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
56. See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
57. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036; Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
58. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN ch. XVII at 117-21 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1991) (1651); John Locke, An Essay Concerning The Truly Original Extent and
End of Civil Government, in THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION §§ 128-31 (J.W. Gough ed., Oxford 1948) (1690).
59. HOBBES, supra note 58; Locke, supra note 58. 
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provided a more expansive statutory or common law right of self-
defense in the home.60 With Heller now on the books, however, that
classically liberal bargain has been rewritten: the individual has a
constitutional right to own an unlocked gun in his home, and per-
haps outside of it, and an inherent or fundamental right to use it,
rather than retreat.61 Under the dicta in DeShaney, the individual
has no such affirmative right to the protection of a state’s police
force,62 and under Heller, the individual has no obligation to rely on
the state’s use of force rather than his own.63 Rather, the threatened
individual may use his constitutionally protected handgun to kill,
in furtherance of his constitutionally protected “inherent” right to
defend himself.64 
Thus, the quintessential Obama-era right is basically a right to
resort to the violence necessary to defend oneself.65 In a state in
which one has neither a right to police protection against private
violence, nor, with steadily decreasing support for public services,
a reasonable expectation that such protection might be forthcoming
when sought, such a right obviously has salience; for fearful resi-
dents of dangerous neighborhoods it provides a right to just the self-
help that seems not just prudent but necessary. The Court in Heller
basically instructed individuals who find themselves in such straits
to fend for themselves. Rather than provide a right to police
protection, the Court has provided instead a right to resort to lethal
violence.
60. See SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 790-1 (8th ed. 2007). These rules were undergoing change even before
Heller, toward expanding the area of the “castle,” thus restricting the obligation of “retreat.”
See P. Luevanda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-
Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right To Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
61. Two decades before Heller, the Court suggested in dicta that the individual has no
right to the state’s protection against violence. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1989). 
62. Id. 
63. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
64. Id. The individual has an inherent right to defend himself, according to Scalia, and
now has a right to the lethal weaponry necessary to do so. Id. at 627-29.
65. Id. at 628-35; see also Anders Walker, From Ballots to Bullets: District of Columbia
v. Heller and the New Civil Rights, 69 LA. L. REV. 509, 539-47 (2009) (discussing the
implications of the Court’s recognition of fundamental right to armed self-defense).
730 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:713
The strength, the centrality, and indeed the jurisprudential
importance of Heller strongly suggests the possibility, and perhaps
the necessity, of reinterpretations of older rights that also involve
a right to kill, such as the right to an abortion created in Roe v.
Wade.66 As in Heller, the contested right in Roe is a right to use
lethal force to protect a liberty interest. And as in Heller, the right
to abort might be justified, in part, on the straightforward grounds
of the right holder’s interest in self-defense: in Heller, self-defense
against intruders into a home and, in Roe, the intrusion of an un-
welcome fetus into a woman’s womb.67 The not-yet-recognized right
to die, long advocated by the political left,68 might also be rethought
as having a similar structure. The right could be justified, particu-
larly in light of Heller, as a right to kill oneself to defend against a
threat of disabling pain.
But second, and perhaps more fundamentally, a number of
Obama-era rights—including not only Heller’s right to weaponry,
but also the “right to marry” advanced by the liberal left69 and the
“right to homeschool” fervently desired by the social conservative
right70—recharacterize the relationship between the citizen and the
state in a way not presaged by earlier civil rights and not foreseen
by the rights critics. All of these rights, I suggest, can be generically
characterized as defensive rights of withdrawal, or, in short, as “exit
rights.” By that phrase, I mean that the rights and arguments for
rights that have come to the fore during the Age of Obama involve
a claimed right to defensively withdraw, or exit, from the social
compact with an incompetent, sub-minimal state: a state that fails
to perform basic, fundamental state functions. These “exit rights”—
as opposed to either the “negative rights” that were the target of
the rights critics or the “positive” rights that were the hoped-for
alternative71—allow the holder to withdraw from the circle of rights
66. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
67. For a powerful presentation of this defense of the abortion right, see EILEEN
MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT 6 (1996).
68. See generally David J. Garrow, The Right To Die: Death with Dignity in America, 68
MISS. L.J. 407, 409-22 (1998) (tracing the political history of efforts to legalize assisted
suicide).
69. See supra note 41.
70. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271,
2342-45 (1990).
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and obligations incumbent upon members of a polity governed by a
state where that withdrawal is desired or desirable not because of
religious conviction or political ideology but rather because of the
state’s inadequacies or ineffectiveness. A defensive right to with-
draw is a right to withdraw from the social compact in order to
defend oneself against state incompetence: where the state has
basically breached, the individual is free to exit. Obama-era rights,
quintessentially, are rights to withdraw from a sub-minimal or
failed state. 
Again, Heller is the clearest example, and its history makes the
point. It is important to remember that a constitutional right to bear
arms was conceived in the 1980s by fringe militia as a right to hold
at bay the feared black helicopters from international powers that
would take over America and destroy American sovereignty72 and
then re-conceived in the 1990s as a right to resist homegrown
American totalitarianism.73 By the time this most peculiar of all
American rights was presented to the Supreme Court for decision,
however, the justification urged by the parties, the various amici
(which included civil rights groups) and then eventually embraced
by the Court, had nothing to do with black helicopters, the United
Nations, world government, or fascistic America. It had to do,
rather, with the inadequacies of inner-city police forces.74 Thus, the
right to bear arms, as ultimately articulated by the Supreme Court,
is not an ideologically driven right desired by a political fringe
fearful of totalitarian or fascistic takeover. Instead, it is an individ-
ual defensive right of withdrawal from the liberal social compact as
envisioned by every major liberal contract theorist from Hobbes and
72. See Michael L. Rowady, Wolverine Fear: An Inside Look at the Citizen Militia
Movement in Michigan and the United States, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 771, 771-76 (1997).
In the mid-1990s it was relatively easy to find militia websites making strong claims about
international threats; today much of their rhetoric has moved to private chat rooms, email
lists, and the like. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE QUIET RETOOLING OF THE MILITIA
MOVEMENT 1 (2004), http://www.adl.org/extremism/Militia/Militia_retools.pdf. Criticism of
the United Nations and its impact on gun rights, if not images of invading helicopters, can
still be found in mainstream gun rights advocacy, however. See Ronald L. Schmeits, How the
United Nations Endangers Your Firearm Freedom, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE
ACTION (Mar. 17, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://www.nraila.org/Issues/Articles/Read.aspx?id=450&
Issue=015.
73. Constitution Party National Platform, THE CONSTITUTION PARTY, http://www.
constitutionparty.com/party_platform.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2011).
74. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635-36 (2008).
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Locke to John Rawls and Robert Nozick, according to which the
state takes up the obligation to protect the citizen and the citizen
lays down his arms. The right, in other words, is necessitated by the
state’s inability or refusal to perform its core duty, which is to
protect the citizen against the violence of other citizens.75 
A state that is incapable of protecting citizens against the vio-
lence of other citizens can be fairly characterized as sub-minimal. A
state that cannot protect citizens against violence is not performing
basic, core responsibilities of the state, as conceived by even the
most libertarian of liberal political philosophers.76 The right to bear
arms, meaning the right to keep a gun in one’s home and use it
against intruders, is a right to do for oneself what a sub-minimal or
failed state cannot or will not do.
At least two other contemporary rights—a right to homeschool
one’s children and a right to marry someone of the same sex—that
have not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court, but which have
gained considerable support in lower courts, state legislatures, and
among some segments of the public, share the same deep structure
and even to some degree a similar history. The newly minted but
deeply desired “right to unregulated homeschooling”—the right to
educate one’s children at home, regardless of the parent-educator’s
own level of education, and without any state regulation of either
curriculum or outcomes—was initially pressed in the 1980s by con-
servative fundamentalist Protestant parents as a First Amendment-
based right to be free of the secular, liberal, equalitarian, and
feminist propagandizing of the public schools.77 The parents’ rights
75. On the duty of the state to protect its citizens, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty
of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 509
(1991). 
76. See, e.g., id. at 515 (discussing Locke’s assertion that individuals form communities
for their mutual preservation).
77. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the school board’s required reading textbooks);
Burrow v. State, 669 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Ark. 1984) (holding that a compulsory school
attendance law did not violate free exercise rights); State v. Riddle, 285 S.E.2d 359, 364 (W.
Va. 1981) (holding that religious beliefs did not justify complete noncompliance with
compulsory school attendance laws); Robert Reich, Testing the Boundaries of Parental
Authority over Education: The Case of Homeschooling, in BRIDGING LIBERALISM AND
MULTICULTURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 145-46 (2002); James B. Dwyer, The Children
We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (1996).
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groups that originally pushed for the right to unsupervised home-
schooling wanted a homeschool education for their children, com-
plete with highly traditional gender roles, a creationist approach to
evolution, and an introduction to Western literature, history, and
culture, that would be in line with their religious beliefs. They could
not find this education in either public schools or affordable private
schools.78 Thus, a highly organized and remarkably successful cam-
paign to legalize homeschooling emerged in virtually all fifty
states.79 Today, however, during the age of Obama, with two million
homeschooled children80—including some untold but large percent-
age with no state supervision whatsoever—courts are increasingly
inclined to grant the existence of this right even if in a more limited
form than parents wish. The rationale for it has shifted consider-
ably. The “right to homeschool” is now argued both by parents’
rights groups and by courts that recognize it as necessitated not by
an overly secular or liberal feminist public school curriculum that
offends the sensibilities of some religious parents but rather by the
inadequacies of failed public schools—not only for religious children
but for all children. Parents, according to the newly secularized
parents’ rights movements, should have the right to withdraw their
children from the public school and educate them (or not) at home,
not so much for ideological or religious reasons but simply because,
in their judgment, the schools are no longer minimally competent at
the basic core task of educating children.81 Most worrisome, school
boards in states with cash-strapped education budgets are increas-
ingly inclined to agree.82 Thus, like the right to own and use a gun
78. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 127 (2008).
79. See id. at 124-25. For additional perspectives on the history of the movement, see
Reich, supra note 77, at 145-48; Laura J. Bach, Note, For God or Grades? States Imposing
Fewer Requirements on Religious Home Schoolers and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1337, 1340 (2004).
80. Yuracko, supra note 78, at 124.
81. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ISSUE BRIEF, 1.5 MILLION HOMESCHOOLED
STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2007, at 3 (2008) (noting that 38 percent of homeschooling
parents chose “concern about the school environment” or “dissatisfaction with academic
instruction at other schools” as their most important reason for homeschooling).
82. The California Department of Education, for example, filed a brief in Jonathan L. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 591 (Ct. App. 2008), supporting
the rights of parents to homeschool with minimal oversight, in part “to allow freedom from
the limitations of the regular classroom.” Michael E. Hersher, “Home Schooling” in California,
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to protect oneself and one’s property against intruders, the right to
homeschool today is articulated as a “defensive right,” or, as above,
an “exit right.” It is a right to withdraw from participation in the
web of rights and responsibilities: in the case of homeschooling, the
right and the obligation to have one’s children educated through the
public or private schools and, in the case of the right to own a gun,
the right and the obligation to rely on the state for protection
against violence. They are implied by a civil society governed by a
democratic state that has become incapable of performing the basic
functions—including educating children and protecting against
violence—for which the state is formed.
Just as the self-defense rationale of Heller has the potential to
recast some long-standing rights of liberal vintage—abortion rights
and the right to die, as well as the newer, or at least reformulated,
“right to marry”—these rights can also be reinterpreted in light of
Heller as defensive or exit rights against a failed state. Start with
abortion. The most novel argument being put forward today for a
right to abort is that the extraordinarily high cost of parenting
basically necessitates the right to abortion.83 With absurdly inad-
equate help from the state for the costs of the health care demanded
by pregnancy and childbirth, almost no state-funded child care, and
no public nursery schools or pre-kindergarten programs in most of
the country, childbirth is an economically calamitous event for
millions of people already living in or near poverty.84 A child, either
a first or an additional, can throw a working-class parent into
poverty and an impoverished parent into utter destitution. A right
to an abortion, against this backdrop, can easily be understood as a
Heller-like defensive right against a state incapable of providing the
requisite degree of assistance to struggling parents necessary to
keep families out of poverty.85 The right to abort, then, is being
recast today as essential to the work of resisting impoverishment,
in a society governed by a state that fails to embrace support for
118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 27 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-
part/legislation/“home-schooling”-in-california/. 
83. Joan C. Williams, Keynote Address: Want Gender Equality? Die Childless at Thirty,
27 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 3, 3-4 (2006).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 11 (noting that the privatization of childrearing in America is driven by the
attitude, “If you can’t take care of your kids, why did you have them?”).
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poor families as a core state responsibility. So understood, abortion
is a defensive right against a sub-minimal state—a defensive right
to avoid the web of parental responsibilities and rights implied by
communal life, in which the state cannot perform essential state
duties. The right to die, more briefly, might follow the same logic: it
can be conceived as an individual right to withdraw from a compact
with a state that cannot provide assistance through palliative care.86 
Finally, the right to marry, not yet embraced by the Court but
accepted by a number of state supreme courts87 and pushed with
increasing success by the liberal left,88 can also be understood
through this Heller paradigm. The right to a state-recognized
marriage gives individuals who may or may not be in love with each
other a right to join in a compact with each other for mutual mone-
tary benefit.89 The case for this right, as articulated by the Human
Rights Campaign, has almost nothing to do with the integrity of gay
life or the morality of gay sex. Rather, it turns largely, if not
entirely, on the inadequacy of the compact between the single
individual and the state or, put differently, between the individual
and civil society.90 What state-regulated marriage grants, in other
words, is a right to one’s spouse’s health insurance, retirement
benefits, military benefits, if any, and pension.91 Given a state with
a shrunken public purse and a shattered safety net, the necessity of
these economic rights is in part a function of single individuals’
86. See Felicia Cohn & Joanne Lynn, Vulnerable People: Practical Rejoinders to Claims
in Favor of Assisted Suicide, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO END-
OF-LIFE CARE 238-40 (Kathleen Foley & Herbert Hendlin eds., 2002) (“Our current health care
system, focused as it is on acute care needs and high-tech procedures, is largely neglectful of
the growing and expensive need for chronic and palliative care.”); Ani B. Satz, The Case
Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1380, 1386-87 (2002).
87. See sources cited supra note 41.
88. The most recent legislative victory at the state level is New York’s Marriage Equality
Act. See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage,
Becoming Largest State To Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at A1; see also, e.g.,
Elizabeth Gill, Historic Victory in Prop. 8 Case, and a Call to Action, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS
(Aug. 5, 2010, 10:45 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/historic-victory-prop-8-case-and-
call-action.
89. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
90. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ABOUT MARRIAGE EQUALITY
3-6 (2004), available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRC_Foundation_Answers_
to_Questions_About_Marriage_Equality_2009.pdf; WEST, supra note 44, at 141-45. 
91. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 90.
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economic fragility. Married partners are somewhat better protected
against the risks and vulnerabilities of middle age, old age, and
declining health than unmarried individuals.92 Extending marriage
rights, then, is simply an extension of a right to withdraw from the
social compact in favor of the marital one. 
To generalize, defensive rights of withdrawal are collectively
rights to withdraw from the social compact with a failed state and
to internalize the functions the state would normally be expected to
perform had it not collapsed. Such rights are justified on the basis
of the inadequacies of the sub-minimal state. A state should protect
citizens against violence. If it fails to do so, a right to own a gun and
use it in self-defense obviously becomes much more desirable. A
state should run a decent public school system. If it cannot or will
not, a right to homeschool becomes far more pressing. A state should
assist with the extraordinary costs of child care, particularly in
early years. If the state fails to do so, the right to avoid parenting
through abortion or contraception becomes vital. A state should
assist with end-of-life care. If it fails to do so, a right to die becomes
much more appealing. A state should assist with the management
of life’s risks, through social security systems, pensions, military
benefits, and the like. If it fails to do so, marriage simply becomes
a better compact and the right to marry all the more imperative.
Unmarried life—that is, an individual’s life lived simply in compact
with the state—is economically untenable, if not calamitous, for
citizens at the edge of poverty.
The tragic rights of our age grant the citizen the right to with-
draw from those bonds of citizenship, and they presuppose a state
incapable of performing basic functions. They are rights to withdraw
from the risks, lethality, and irresponsibility of a shredded social
compact. They are rights to choose a state of nature over a state of
a badly tattered and increasingly dangerous civil society.
92. See Marc S. Schulz & Robert J. Waldinger, What’s Love Got To Do With It?: Social
Functioning, Perceived Health, and Daily Happiness in Married Octogenarians, 25 PSYCHOL.
& AGING 422, 422 (2010).
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III. THE FAILURE OF COMMUNITY
Before examining what it would mean to reinvigorate the rights
critique for Obama-era rights, it would help to be much clearer on
what the rights critique was not. First, the critics did not, for the
most part, target the idea of rights—whether the Kantian idea of
rights,93 a universalist idea of human rights, an ideal understanding
of what our rights should be, or any other philosophical understand-
ing of the point, potential, deep structure, or promise of rights. They
were not, for example, criticizing the antipositivist idea of rights
held by the American and French revolutionaries and targeted by
Bentham’s complaint that rights are “nonsense upon stilts.”94 They
did not take aim at various natural rights traditions sometimes
pilloried by the Legal Realists95 or the rights central to the natural
law traditions addressed by H.L.A. Hart.96 They were not targeting
essential attributes that all rights anywhere and everywhere share,
regardless of their institutional or historical context.97 The critics
did not attack the philosophical structure of rights, the conception
of human nature that bolsters such a structure, or the ideals of
liberty and equality toward which rights often aspire. The rights
critique, in sum, was not a critique of the general or philosophical
idea of rights.
Nor were the rights critics, however, merely criticizing the par-
ticular rights held by particular interest groups at the time they
were writing—the antidiscrimination right held by racial minor-
93. See Horwitz, supra note 2, at 399.
94. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 501 (1843).
95. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 837-38 (1935); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly
Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471-72 (1923).
96. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185-212 (2d ed. 1994); H.L.A. Hart, American
Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV.
969, 978-79 (1977).
97. Examples of such rights include supposed attributes shared by the constitutional
rights of slaveholders to their slaves, the aspirational rights of those same slaves to freedom,
or the First Amendment rights of pornographers to their pornography, or of the victims of
pornography to be free of it, of South Africans to a decent living wage, or of property owners
not to have their property “taken” for redistribution to others. 
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ities,98 the right to privacy held by pregnant women,99 the rights to
hate speech held by racist groups,100 rights to property or contract
held by landowners and employers, respectively,101 and so on. The
rights critique was not a collection of individualized criticisms of
particular, constitutional rights any more than it was a critique of
the general concept of a right. Rather—and this is obviously itself
an interpretive claim—the rights critique, viewed “in its best
light,”102 was concerned with putting forward a new interpre-
tation of the dominant rights of the last third of the twentieth
century: antidiscrimination rights stemming from the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Acts,103 contract and property
rights of longer vintage,104 privacy rights created by the Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut105 and Roe,106 rights of criminal defen-
dants,107 and various speech rights.108 According to the rights
critique, these rights first presupposed, and then implicitly
propagated, a particular conception of the human being, the citizen,
and the state, and hence of the relation of citizen and state.
Contingently, they argued, that conception of the state, of the
human being, and the citizen was more harmful than not: the good
it did was overshadowed by its legitimating, subordinating, and
alienating consequences.109 It was that understanding of state,
98. Freeman, supra note 4, at 1053-54.
99. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 93.
100. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2321-22 (1989).
101. See sources cited supra notes 23, 28.
102. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 90 (1986).
103. Freeman, supra note 4, at 1056-57.
104. See Gabel, supra note 30, at 1581-82; Gordon, supra note 5, at 203; Kelman, supra
note 29, at 797.
105. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 93; Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1365-69.
107. Seidman, supra note 26, at 680; Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov’s Question: Self-
Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 154 (1990).
108. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1386-92.
109. Thus, Horwitz’s article on rights addresses the position of rights in nineteenth- and
twentieth-century America, not rights in general, human rights, or South African rights, or
even rights in other western democracies. See Horwitz, supra note 2. On the other hand, the
rights critique was not simply a critique of those particular rights but rather a claim that
those nineteenth- and-twentieth-century rights both presuppose and then propagate a
particular understanding of the relationship of citizen, state, and community that prioritizes
the interests of property holders over everyone else—and does real harm. Part of that harm
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citizen, individual, community, and the relations between them, as
defined and reflected in the dominant rights of the era, the rights
critics quite plausibly claimed, that was harmful to the party of
humanity. It was not the general idea of rights and not simply the
particular rights themselves. 
In brief, the rights critics targeted a particular conception of
citizen and state implied by liberal rights, and central to what
critics and their targets alike called “legal liberalism.”110 It is helpful
to affirmatively articulate that liberal conception and then restate
the critique. Late twentieth-century liberal rights, according to their
most ardent devotees, rested on an ideal conception of free and
equal citizens, empowered by rights against a potentially dangerous
state that was overly inclined toward intrusive, moralistic, and
discriminatory actions and was at times paranoically fearful of the
disruptive effects on law and order of individual criminality, ram-
bunctious behavior, licentious speech, political extremism, an unreg-
ulated media, and treasonous thoughts.111 Deontic, liberal, individ-
ual rights against the policies and utilities of the state, then, would
protect individuals against states so inclined and basically would do
so for all time, both when governing majorities believed the in-
trusions to be warranted and when they did not.112 The legislative
and executive branches in particular, ruled by irrational, whimsical,
and indeed infantile majorities, like any unruly mob, could not be
trusted not to intrude into individual thought, behavior, or speech,
or to do so in a rational—rather than invidiously irrational and
in turn is the effect it has on other and later rights, including rights advocated on behalf of
the dispossessed. Id. at 399-400. Similarly, Mark Tushnet’s claim that rights do harm was
primarily directed at negative U.S. constitutional rights. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1392-94.
The claim was not that all rights necessarily carry these harms; Tushnet recognizes explicitly
the logical possibility of positive rights. Nevertheless, U.S. rights have been overwhelmingly
negative—that presupposes a minimalist understanding of the state, nonresponsive to
citizens’ needs. Id. at 1393. Given the dominance of these rights, attempts to create new and
better rights are more likely than not to be co-opted. Id.
110. For an overview of the how the concept of legal liberalism emerged, changed over time,
and was challenged by critics, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM (1998).
111. One can see this portrayed powerfully in Ronald Dworkin’s definitive work. RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). For representative critical commentary on this
vision, see Peter Gabel, Dworkin: Taking Rights Seriously, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302, 314-15
(1977) (book review).
112. DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 184-205, 259-65.
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discriminatory—way.113 Individuals must be protected by rights, the
liberal concludes, against the state’s missteps so that they can be
free to act on their own individualized conceptions of the good life,114
exercise their natural autonomy, make choices about their reproduc-
tive and productive lives,115 worship freely to connect with the God
of their choosing or of their faith,116 be judged on their merits, rather
than skin color or sex, and choose intimacy by reference to their
inclination or orientation. The state, in its legislative and executive
mode, might be overly intrusive or might act on uninformed or
bigoted short-term preferences of voters or legislate in hateful or
simply irrational ways and thereby threaten all of this.117 The
courts, however, with life-tenured judges, a longer time frame, a
sensitivity to long-term interests, a built-in capacity to resist short-
term pressures, a professional dispensation to exercise reason
113. See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1529, 1550-51 (2000).
114. The claim that individuals must be free to act on their own conception of the good life
was central to all forms of mid- and late twentieth-century liberalism. See, e.g., BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 327 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, What is
Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 343-44 (1981). 
115. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: MORAL READINGS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 21 (1996). 
116. For a recent liberal defense of traditional understandings of the free exercise clause,
see MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: DEFENDING AMERICA’S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 3-5 (2008).
117.
It cannot be true, on this test, that anyone has a right to have all the laws of the
nation enforced. He has right to have enforced only those criminal laws, for
example, that he would have a right to have enacted if they were not already
law. The laws against personal assault may well fall into that class. If the
physically vulnerable members of the community—those who need police
protection against personal violence—were only a small minority, it would still
seem plausible to say that they were entitled to that protection. But the laws
that provide a certain level of quiet in public places, or that authorize and
finance a foreign war, cannot be thought to rest on individual rights. The timid
lady on the streets of Chicago is not entitled to just the degree of quiet that now
obtains, nor is she entitled to have boys drafted to fight in wars she approves.
There are laws—perhaps desirable laws—that provide these advantages for her,
but the justification for these laws, if they can be justified at all, is the common
desire of a large majority, not her personal right. If, therefore, these laws do
abridge someone else’s moral right to protest, or his right to personal security,
she cannot urge a competing right to justify the abridgement. She has no
personal right to have such laws passed, and she has no competing right to have
them enforced either.
DWORKIN, supra note 111, at 194-95 
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rather than will, and the ability to rest decision making on principle
rather than the irrational passions of the moment, can protect our
rights. Hence, because the state is, after all, us, the Court can
protect the individual rights holder from his own worst instincts
when voting.118 With rights in place limiting the powers of the state,
majorities, executives, and voting publics, a fragile balance can be
struck between “individual” freedom and “public” policy; between
dialogue, dissent, and idiosyncratic genius on the one hand and
legislative necessity on the other. 
This liberal image of society and of the state on which rights rest
was the target of most of the rights critique. It was also, to revert to
aesthetic metaphor, overwhelmingly “comedic,”119 perhaps even a bit
euphoric. In a liberal utopia, powers are nicely separated and
balanced but, more importantly, so is the relation of community and
individual. Communities need to be secure and safe, and must
protect the morals, health, and welfare of the people, or at least
must do so to some extent. At the same time, the individuals within
that community need to be given the liberty to be autonomous and
to take risks. Individual freedom is threatened not by anything
terribly mendacious but rather by states, legislatures, and majori-
ties inclined toward nothing worse than excessive moralism, nanny-
state interference, and a tad too much redistributive tinkering,
all directed toward the laudable and noble end of protecting the
sensitivities of the weak and the needs of the disempowered.
Unrestrained states will incline toward being overly punitive, overly
intrusive, and overly paternalistic, and too inclined to legislate for
the interest of the weak, thus sapping the life-giving powers of the
strong. But rights, protected by courts, can restrain them from doing
so. The same state whose will is exercised through legislation that
sometimes overreaches is capable, through courts, of principled
reason that stays the legislator’s hand. The state can be willful and
reasoned, as can the human being; its willfulness exercised legis-
118. Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531,
572 (1998).
119. I am drawing on Northrop Frye’s conception of comedy, as described in his classic book
of literary criticism, ANATOMY OF CRITICISM: FOUR ESSAYS 43-49 (1957). Elsewhere, I have
drawn out an extended comparison of Frye’s aesthetic categories—tragedy, comedy, irony, and
romance—and correlated them with jurisprudential impulses. See West, Jurisprudence as
Narrative, supra note 17, at 146-47.
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latively, its reason, judicially. Like the natural person, it can
appreciate long-term and short-term interests and achieve a
harmony between the two. 
Without denying too much of this essentially comedic picture of
social life and the individual’s place within it, the 1980s rights
critics complemented it with a heavy dose of irony.120 The private
realm that rights protect, the critics argued, consists not only of
individuals going about their madcap, idiosyncratic, free-wheeling,
dissenting, licentious business, but also of individuals willfully
subordinating others, whose subordination is then insulated against
even notice—much less critique—in the name of liberty.121 It
consists not only of individuals wanting nothing so much as to be
left alone but also of individuals who want very much to connect in
meaningful ways with others, but who find those desires for
connection frustrated.122 It consists not only of individuals enjoying
the rewards of rightful meritocracy and freedoms to choose but also
of individuals suffering the injustices of a world in which their needs
are neither acknowledged nor fulfilled.123 This world of subordina-
tion, of longing for connection, and of abject need and misery is what
the world of liberal, individualistic, comedic rights denies. The
liberal envisioned a world with a nanny state sometimes inclined to
be overly intrusive but happily constrained by principle, articulated
and governed by wise and benign paternalistic courts, so that the
often childish but occasionally brilliant citizenry might thrive and
grow into their autonomous, freely chosen sexual, reproductive, and
productive lives. The critic saw a world constructed by those same
rights as one in which the state perpetuates subordination, alien-
ation, and injustice and does so in the name of individual liberty.
120. Again, I am comparing the critics’ ironic portrayal of private life with the definition
and account of irony presented in Frye’s account of irony in literature. FRYE, supra note 119,
at 40-49.
121. The critics drew heavily on earlier writing by American Realists that made a
comparable point. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 603, 605-06 (1943); Hale, supra note 95, at 477.
122. Gabel, supra note 30, at 1566-67.
123. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1394 (“People need food and shelter right now, and
demanding that those needs be satisfied—whether or not satisfying them can today
persuasively be characterized as enforcing a right—strikes me as more likely to succeed than
claiming that existing rights to food and shelter must be enforced.”). 
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And what of the world portrayed in Obama-era rights? What kind
of social order does the world of recently minted or newly reminted
rights contemplate? It is not the comedic world of 1960s through
1980s liberalism. Rather, I believe it is fair to characterize the world
envisioned and constructed by lethal and exit rights as deeply,
although darkly, romantic.124 The individual is heroic (unless or
until he becomes criminal), and the state that would legislate to
take his property or his liberty is not simply nannyish, inclined
toward overreach, but malignant, inclined toward theft. The state
cannot or will not protect him from the violence of criminals, so the
romantic hero must have a gun to protect himself, his home, and his
hearth. The state cannot educate his children decently, so the heroic
individual must educate them himself, free of the state’s undue and
unwanted secularism. The state cannot be trusted to take from the
wealthy through taxation to give to the unfortunate, so the heroic
individual must do it himself through his church. The state cannot
or will not help with the expenses required for child care, palliative
care, or health care, so the heroic individual must make choices
regarding whether to have children, whether to abort, whether to
suffer pain or to kill himself, whether to risk life and limb or hunker
down and buy health insurance. All of these decisions are made,
whether or not in splendid isolation, without the burden of malig-
nant regulation, of a state seeking rents and taxing effort, of
collectives bending the will and snuffing the spirit of the individual.
The state will protect the individual from criminality both here and
abroad, and will do so with fierce determination. Otherwise, it is
incapacitated, and properly so, from interfering with the heroism of
individual will and wit.
As the comedic world of 1960s to 1980s liberalism omitted an
ironic underside, which the rights critics of the era brought to the
surface, so this libertarian romance with an incapacitated state and
empowered supermen omits its tragic complement. It should be the
work of contemporary rights critics to unearth its tragic undertow.
The rights peculiar to the age of Obama protect the romantic indi-
vidual’s right to withdraw from an utterly incapacitated state. But
what of the world left behind? Those guns, in home cupboards or
124. FRYE, supra note 119, at 33.
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which we legally carry, kill. Every abortion ends a life, as does every
medicinal suicide. The homeschooled child may pass tests but may
have badly hampered life opportunities as a result. The married
couple, both heterosexual and homosexual, can withdraw into a
cocoon of mutual financial benefit. The unmarried are left strug-
gling with the meager and unraveling remains of a deeply inade-
quate social safety net. 
And what of the domestic state in this world of romantic individu-
als? Some of those individuals, in fitting tragic fashion, are scat-
tered dead on the stage, but at least some of them are still free to
wander. The state and the community that gives rise to it, however,
is nowhere; it is shattered. It is not simply sensibly constrained by
benign patriarchal courts. It is annihilated. It was not simply prone
to nannyism, such that it had to be reined in; it was prone to
malignancy, such that it had to be destroyed. And destroyed it was.
It cannot educate children, because it lacks the funds to do so.
Instead, it offers rights to educate at home and public schooling is
something to avoid. It cannot support the efforts of poor and
working-class individuals to parent; if they choose to abort, so be it.
It cannot support the health-care needs of the sick and dying. If they
cannot bear it, the state offers them rights to die. It cannot support
entitlements to a living wage, shelter, or food, a decent education,
or a dignified job. Its purse is spent elsewhere. So the state gives its
needy citizens rights instead: rights to kill, abort, and die; rights to
enjoy sex with whom, and even to marry whom, they please, and all
free of unpleasant reproductive consequences. It gives them death
or carnivals.
CONCLUSION 
We are in a different era now, one in which the relationship of
state and citizen implied by individual rights is quite different than
that suggested by liberal rights devotees or their 1980s-styled
critics. Today’s defensive rights to withdraw imply a state that is
either incapacitated, and thus incapable of performing the minimal
duties of statehood, or malignant, and thus not to be trusted to do
so. It is not the ironic or comedic bumbling liberal state, inclined to
be a bit too intrusive, or even the state suggested by liberalism’s
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critics: a state that neglects the subordination or private injustice
it so blithely chooses to ignore. The state presupposed by these
modern rights to withdraw is instead the state that has been
shattered. The tragedy of these rights of withdrawal is not just the
lethality that follows in their wake. It is also the horrific, yawning
chasm where a civic society, a community, and state could once be
found.
Tragic dramas end. But our world does not; these are not end
times. The response to these rights, if this account is at all accurate,
is not to press against them in court or outside of courts, or to press
for better rights, positive rights, or “the right rights,” as they used
to be called. The response has to be to rebuild the domestic state so
darkly presupposed by the rights to withdraw. That requires, in
turn, a reactivated citizenry ready to create bonds of mutual assis-
tance. Citizens are sovereigns in an active democracy,125 and
sovereigns are responsible for the well-being of subjects. Citizens,
then, are responsible for the well-being of each other, if a democratic
state is to function effectively. Yet, we have no discourse, or even
language, with which to describe these sovereign responsibilities
of citizenship. We have a language of negative rights to describe the
rights we each possess to be sovereign over our own individual
lives. We have a language of positive rights, even if we lack the
rights themselves, to express our entitlement as citizens to assis-
tance from the state, if only we had one. We also have a private
language of our obligations, as people of faith or good will, of
charitable assistance to each other. We do not, however, have a
language or a discourse with which we regularly express our sov-
ereign obligations to support and assist each other. We are the
state; citizen-sovereigns are the state, as Hannah Alejandro has
powerfully argued.126 If the state should protect each of us from
private violence, we have a sovereign obligation, as sovereign
citizens, to support the police forces through taxes and labor so that
it might do so. If the state is obligated to educate all of our children,
125. For an excellent discussion of the general obligation of citizens as sovereigns, and a
general accounting of the idea of citizen sovereignty, see Hannah Alejandro, The Sovereign
Obligations of We, the People: An Argument for Compulsory Voting in the United States 18-
23 (Mar. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract=1789900.
126. Id.
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then we have an obligation, through our labor and our taxes, to
support the system of public education by which that education is
conveyed. If we do not, as citizen sovereigns, support these public
functions of states, then the state will fail, and we will turn,
inevitably, to tragic rights to withdraw so that we might perform
these state functions ourselves. If we believe that protection of
citizens against violence, education of children, assistance with
health and child care, and provisions for persons in abject poverty
are basic state functions, then citizens, as the sovereigns from whom
the state draws its power, must support and fund these state
functions. Courts and the rights they create, when they create them,
will not be of any help in that effort. The only response to tragic
individual rights to withdraw must come from citizens, who might
one day come to prefer, as central to the meaning of their sover-
eignty, an obligation to engage, rather than a right to withdraw. 
